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Ti  = 0.23 ( x - d1  - d2 )              if 12.214 <  x  ≤  114
Ti  = 0.23 ( x - d2 )                         if 114 <  x  ≤  193.627
Ti  = 0.23 (193.627– d2) + 0.33 (x – 193.627)            if x  > 193.627
From the result of Baldini et al. the total tax burden loss is 30.47 billion of Euro
(approximately 100% more than the Executive estimates).
Already looking at the charts 3 and 4 by means of the equivalent household post tax income
notion, it notes that all population shares gain by the fall in the tax liabilities and the average
tax rates behavior along the income parade continues to depart from proportionality, but in a
different way, probably becoming structurally less progressive (post tax income gains higher
for the top deciles).
This is confirmed by the Reynolds-Smolensky index.
Gini pre - Gini post =  ПRS =  ПK * g /( 1- g)    -  R
Old
Tax   0.3777    0.3403 0.0374 0.2171   0.1801 0.001699
Tax
Ref.   0.3777    0.3530 0.0247 0.1992   0.1283 0.000857
                                                                         Sources: Bosi et al. 2002
These results show a fall in ПRS index according to the decrease of g (total tax ratio) and ПK.
The lower reranking effect is not sufficient to overcome these reductions.
In conclusion even if the Executive objective is to pay more attention to the low and middle-
income group, the researchers affirm that 55% of the total tax burden loss goes to incomes
higher than 50000 Euro (not more than 5% of the total population). Together with the negative
variation of ПRS index, this allows to affirm that the redistribution continues to go from the
richer group to the poorer, but with a reduction of intensity31.
Clearly, any analysis based on redistributive indexes may be accepted according to a given
F(x), that is a given distribution of pre tax (equivalent) incomes.
4 - Non-Progression Neutral Tax Cut: Conclusive Remarks
In the literature, outcomes about the vertical distance between L1X - T  and L2 X - T for all p
(where L2 X - T is the Concentration curve for the post reform post tax incomes) and then about
                                                
31 - According to the fact that this tax reform does not lead to a negative income tax, 20% of poorest families gain
only 2% of the total tax burden fall.
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distributional effects, have been obtained taking into account the pre tax income distribution in
two different ways.
According to Jakobsson (1976, proposition 1) it is possible to state that
RP2 ≤ RP1   ∀ x     iff     L2X - T  ≥ L1 X – T             for every pre tax distribution F(x)
In order to investigate the distributional effect of different schedules only the information
about magnitudes of marginal and average rates is required.
On the other hand consistent with Hemming and Keen (1983, proposition 1), when two
income taxes (T2,T1)  raise the same revenue32
“an income tax (T2) is more progressive than another (T1) for a given pre tax
distribution F(x)  if and only if the post tax income function (x – T2) single crosses
from above the post tax income function (x – T1) on some interval Y  = [xmin, xmax]”.
In the former case it obtains a global result and it can define a comparison between any two
schedules by using their specifications, verifying if the residual progression is increased or not
for all x.
In the latter, relative distributional implications of alternative taxes can be defined also if it
verifies a single-crossing condition between the two post tax income schedules conditional on
the pre tax distribution33. For g1 = g2, the two curves must intersect  - a pure-redistributive case
- as a result the only remaining trouble is just find which is the curve that single crosses the
other from above.
Hence when this distribution is such that tax schedules are equal-yield also for Hemming and
Keen the only necessary information comes from the form of Ti (i = 1,2, in our case).
In contrast when non-equal yield taxes have to be compared, the post tax schedules may not
necessarily cross. In such a case Hemming and Keen were able to define a transformation of
post tax schedules that involves a new type of single-crossing condition.
Let [x – t2(x)] be the post tax reform income schedule, [x – t1(x)] the old schedule, L2X – T    and   
L1X – T   their respective Lorenz curves34. The condition of Lorenz domination (LD) of new
schedule over the old one, for the equal-yield case is, for all v those belong to Y
      v                                                                                                                 v
∫ [x – t2(x)] f(x) dx /  ∫y [x – t2(x)] f(x) dx     ≥    ∫ [x – t1(x)] f(x) dx / ∫y [x – t1(x)] f(x) dx
      x
min
                                                                                                 x
min
                                                
32 - This proposition may be adapted if it wish to follow Kakwani (1977) approach, relating progressivity to the
distribution of the tax burden.
33 - If the elasticity condition of Jakobsson theorem holds, it is well known that this implies at most a single
crossing, while the reverse is not true.
34 - To simplify we assume LiX – T  (i= 1,2) as a Lorenz curve.
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By assuming g1 = g2,                    ∫y [x – t2(x)] f(x) dx  = ∫y [x – t1(x)] f(x) dx
Hence only the numerators are relevant for Hemming and Keen’s proof.
By following a normalization procedure for both sides it can deal, at least for the sufficiency
condition, with a non equal-yield case (g1 ≠ g2) as an equal-yield one, that is acting on the post
tax income function in such a way to have
                  v                                                                                                                                          v
∫ { [x – ti(x)] /  ∫y [u – ti(u)] f(u) du }f(x) dx            =          ∫  [x – ti(x)]N f(x) dx
                x
min                                                                                              
                                                   x
min
where     [x – ti(x)]N  =  [x – ti(x)] /  ∫y [u– ti(u)] f(u) du                                            i= 1, 2
indicates the share of total net income associated with pre tax income x under ti(x) given F(x).
Making the same operation on the denominator:
∫y {[x – ti(x)] / ∫y [u – ti(u)] f(u) du } f(x) dx        =       [1 / (1 – gi)] ∫y {[x – ti(x)] f(x) dx  =
=  [1 / (1 – g)] (1 – g) = 1                                                i = 1, 2
and it can rewrite the condition for LD as:
                           v                                                                      v
∫  [x – t2(x)]N f(x) dx      ≥       ∫  [x – t1(x)]N f(x) dx      for all v ε Y
                     x
min                                
                                   x
min
In this way Hemming and Keen show how also in this case it is possible to make use of the
same proof for the sufficiency, as when the total tax ratios are equal. Their propositions is
necessary with respect to the Italian tax reform under analysis. Even if I have not many data it
may infer some interesting information just looking at this chart:
                    Average tax rates for household equivalent post tax income
                                                                          Sources:  Baldini-Bosi-Matteuzzi 2002
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By the decrease of average rates for all the deciles, post tax reform household equivalent
incomes may be considered higher than under the old schedule. This chart seems to involve a
tax cut for all the families, increasing along the income parade: the progressivity changes.
On the other hand, for instance, with a residual progression neutral tax cut the gain in
percentage terms has to be equal for every households, in accordance with:
          tr(x) = t1(x) – a [x- t1(x)]          (or    tr(x) / x = t1(x) / x – a [1- t1(x) / x]      where a > 0)
and    x- tr(x) = [1 + a] [x- t1(x)]
This residual progression neutral tax cut would push down the old piecewise linear curve for
the average rates by the term
a [1- t1(x)/x]
The elasticity RP for every deciles would remain constant, [1 – t’(x)] / [1 – t(x)/x], then also
the slope: the vertical distance between the two curves would be equal.
If it imposes an equal-yield (gr = g2) residual progression neutral tax cut, this leads to an RP
neutral curve of average rates that single crosses once from below the tax reform schedule of
average rates (t2(x) / x).
Moreover the Lorenz curves with respect to the old schedule and the RP neutral tax cut are
exactly superimposes.
More generally it can be shown that   a = (g1 – gr) / (1 – g1)
Then   x- tr (x)     = [x- t1(x)] + [(g1 – gr) / (1 – g1)] [x- t1(x)]  =
                             = [x- t1(x)] [ 1 +  (g1 – gr) / (1 – g1)]   =
                             = [x- t1(x)] [(1 – gr) / (1 – g1)]
Hence, by using the fact that gr = g2 it can compare the two schedules
x - t2(x)   with respect to   [x- t1(x)] [(1 – gr) / (1 – g1)] =  x- tr(x)
In this case the proposition changes and it can be shown that:
“If [x - t2 (x)] /(1 – g2) crosses [x – t1(x)] / (1 – g1) once from above, then
L2X – T (p)  ≥ L1X – T  (p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]”35.
                                                
35 - Where, as before,  [x – t i (x)] / (1 – gi) =  [x – ti(x)]N    (i = 1,2), is the share of total net income associated with
pre-tax income x under ti (x) given the F (x).
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In our case the reality seems to contradict this proposition because, like in a mirror, if the RP
neutral curve of average rates single crosses once from below the tax reform schedule of
average rates, the RP neutral post tax income curve single crosses once from above the tax
reform schedule of post tax income, while to ensure LD for the distribution of net incomes
under the tax reform over the distribution of net incomes under the old schedule, it should be
the opposite: the Executive’s policy seems apparent.
From another point of view, it finds that the necessary condition of Latham (1988, theorem
5) may be verified.
Latham states that (αi = distribution of net incomes under the two schedules):
“given that g2 < g1, α2 L.D α1 only if there exists an interval (xmin, x*) over
which t1 (x) < t2 (x), where xmin < x* <  x max.”
Reasonably, observing the chart this interval seems to exist, but it is not enough to ensure
Lorenz dominance: in this case it appears that after-tax incomes are higher everywhere, as
allowed by the theorem.
Hence, apparent results can be obtained by the use of these theorems. What the practitioner
needs is either the functional form of the tax, or post tax, schedules, or these functional forms
together with the total net income, as in Hemming and Keen’s non-equal yield case.
To summarize:
• According to Baldini et al. (2002) the total tax burden loss is 30,47 billion of Euro
(around 100% more than the Executive estimates);
• The inequality of the distribution of the net incomes increases with respect to the old
distribution of after-tax incomes, as a result of both total tax ratio and
disproportionality of tax burden (progression) reductions;
• Assessing by the analysis of this section, the result of a lower Reynolds-Smolensky
index finds confirmation by the unverified Hemming-Keen’s single-crossing condition,
useful especially to work when it is not possible to assess effects by using the
Jakobsson’s elasticity condition;
• If one of the objectives of the Executive is to decrease the total tax ratio, a RP neutral
tax cut for all could be regarded as a possibility to increase social welfare. By Baldini
et al. (2002) there is evidence that other strategies are possible to avoid the
progressivity reduction and, at the same time, to cut in the same way the total tax
burden.
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• All the results of these chapters are correct in a partial equilibrium framework: the
distribution of pre tax income is assumed to be independent of the tax code in
operation and, of course, it has to be convincing that - using a utility function where
the (equivalent) incomes are the only input - a social welfare function such as
                                                                                                      y
WF  =  ∫ U (x) f (x) dx
                                                                                                                          0
is related with the actual well-being of the society.
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